F-35, not F-22, to Protect U.S. Airspace

Homeland Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Management of Air
Sovereignty Alert Operations to Protect U.S. Airspace
GAO-09-184, January 27, 2009
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09184.pdf


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Sovereignty Alert Operations to Protect U.S. Airspace' which was
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Report to Congressional Requesters:

United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:

January 2009:

Homeland Defense:

Actions Needed to Improve Management of Air Sovereignty Alert
Operations to Protect U.S. Airspace:

GAO-09-184:

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-09-184, a report to congressional requesters.

Why GAO Did This Study:

According to U.S. intelligence, the threat to U.S airspace remains.
The
North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is to defend U.S.
air
space and the U.S. Air Force has 18 sites in the United States that
conduct air sovereignty alert (ASA) operations. ASA operations
support
fighter aircraft in conducting homeland air defense operations. GAO
examined the extent to which (1) NORAD has adopted a risk-based
management approach to determine ASA operational requirements; (2)
the
Air Force has implemented ASA operations as a steady-state mission in
accordance with Department of Defense (DOD), NORAD, and Air Force
directives and guidance; (3) the Air Force assesses the readiness of
units conducting ASA operations; and (4) the Air Force faces
challenges
in sustaining ASA operations for the future and what plans, if any,
it
has to address such challenges. GAO reviewed relevant ASA guidance,
directives, and planning documents; and interviewed DOD officials,
including the commanders of all 18 ASA sites.

What GAO Found:

Responding to individual requests from DOD, NORAD has done some
assessments to determine ASA operational requirements. NORAD has not
adopted a risk-based approach to determining ASA requirements,
including routine risk assessments. Although GAO previously reported
on
the benefits to organizations that routinely do risk assessments to
determine program requirements, NORAD does not conduct such
assessments
because DOD does not require NORAD to do so. However, such
assessments
could enhance NORAD’s ability to determine and apply the appropriate
levels and types of units, personnel, and aircraft for the ASA
mission.

The Air Force has not implemented ASA operations in accordance with
DOD, NORAD, and Air Force directives and guidance, which instruct the
Air Force to establish ASA as a steady-state (ongoing and indefinite)
mission. The Air Force has not implemented the 140 actions it
identified to establish ASA as a steady-state mission, which included
integrating ASA operations into the Air Force’s planning,
programming,
and funding cycle. The Air Force has instead been focused on other
priorities, such as overseas military operations. While implementing
ASA as a steady-state mission would not solve all of the challenges
the
units must address, it would help them mitigate some of the
challenges
associated with conducting both their ASA and warfighting missions.

NORAD has partially assessed the readiness of ASA units; however the
Air Force has not evaluated personnel, training, and quantity and
quality of equipment. Readiness measures are designed to ensure that
DOD forces are properly trained, equipped, and prepared to conduct
their assigned missions. For example, while NORAD evaluated the
extent
to which aircraft were maintained for ASA operations and the units’
ability to respond to an alert and to locate and intercept aircraft,
it
did not evaluate training. Because the Air Force has not implemented
ASA as a steady-state mission or formally assigned the mission to the
units, it does not assess ASA readiness. By assessing the readiness
of
units that consistently conduct ASA operations, DOD would be better
assured that these units are organized, trained, and equipped to
perform ASA operations.

The Air Force faces two challenges to sustaining its ASA capabilities
over the long term—(1) replacing or extending the service life of
aging
fighter aircraft and (2) replacing ASA units with equipment and
trained
personnel when they deploy. For example, if aircraft are not replaced
by 2020, 11 of the 18 current air sovereignty alert sites could be
without aircraft. The Air Force has not developed plans to mitigate
these challenges because it has been focused on other priorities.
Plans
would provide the Air Force information that could assist it in
ensuring the long-term sustainability of ASA operations and the
capability of ASA units to protect U.S. airspace.

What GAO Recommends:

GAO recommends that DOD conduct routine risk assessments, implement
ASA
as a steady-state mission, and develop plans to address future
challenges. DOD agreed with some and partially agreed with other
recommendations. GAO clarified the recommendations based on DOD
comments on a draft of this report.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click
on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-09-184]. For more
information, contact Davi M. D'Agostino at (202) 512-5431 or
dagostinod (AT) gao (DOT) gov.

[End of section]

Contents:

Letter:

Results in Brief:

Background:

NORAD Has Assessed ASA Operational Requirements but Not on a Routine
Basis as Part of a Risk-Based Management Approach:

The Air Force Has Not Implemented ASA Operations as a Steady-State
Mission in Accordance with NORAD, DOD, and Air Force Directives and
Guidance:

Readiness of Units Performing ASA Operations is Partially Assessed by
NORAD and PACOM but Not by the Air Force:

ASA Operations Face Significant Challenges to Long-Term
Sustainability,
but the Air Force Has Not Developed Plans to Mitigate These
Challenges:

Conclusion:

Recommendations for Executive Action:

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgements:

Related GAO Products:

Tables:

Table 1: A Five-Phase Risk-Based Management Framework:

Table 2: DOD Commands and Organizations That We Visited During This
Review:

Table 3: ASA Units That We Contacted During Our Structured
Interviews:

Figures:

Figure 1: F-15s on Alert at Portland, Oregon ASA Site:

Figure 2: F-16 on Alert at Atlantic City, New Jersey ASA Site:

Figure 3: Locations of the 18 Steady-State ASA Sites in the United
States as of October 2008:

Figure 4: Differences Between ASA Operations and Homeland Defense Air
Missions:

Figure 5: Factors Identified by ASA Unit Commanders as Moderately or
Greatly Impacting Units' Ability to Conduct ASA Operations:

Figure 6: Projected Number of Current ASA Sites with and without
Viable
Aircraft to Conduct ASA Operations between Fiscal Years 2008 and 2032
based on current F-22 and F-35 Fielding Schedules:

Abbreviations:

AFB: Air Force Base:

ANG: Air National Guard:

ANGB: Air National Guard Base:

ANGS: Air National Guard Station:

ASA: Air Sovereignty Alert:

DOD: Department of Defense:

EXORD: Execution Order:

NGB/ANG: National Guard Bureau/Air National Guard:

NORAD: North American Aerospace Defense Command:

NORTHCOM: U.S. Northern Command:

PACOM: U.S. Pacific Command:

[End of section]

United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:

January 27, 2009:

The Honorable Patrick Leahy:
United States Senate:

The Honorable Christopher S. Bond:
United States Senate:

The Honorable Gene Taylor:
House of Representatives:

The Honorable Frank A. LoBiondo:
House of Representatives:

In the hours after the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the North
American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) [Footnote 1] engaged in
efforts to defend the air sovereignty of the United States against a
new type of air attack--one that was initiated from within our own
borders. Although federal agencies responsible for protecting
domestic
airspace have taken measures to deter such attacks, the National
Strategy for Aviation Security, issued in March 2007, recognizes that
air attacks are still a threat to the United States and its people.
[Footnote 2] U.S. intelligence agencies have also stated that the
threat to U.S air sovereignty remains.

The commander of NORAD is charged with the missions of aerospace
warning and aerospace control for North America.[Footnote 3] To
accomplish these missions, NORAD has fully fueled, fully armed
aircraft
and trained personnel on alert 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, at 18
air sovereignty alert (ASA) sites across the United States. The Air
Force provides NORAD with personnel and equipment for these
operations
including fighter aircraft, which include F-15 and F-16 aircraft as
shown in figures 1 and 2.

Figure 1: F-15s on Alert at Portland, Oregon ASA Site (photograph):

[Refer to PDF for image]

Source: U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt John Hughel.

[End of figure]

Figure 2: F-16 on Alert at Atlantic City, New Jersey ASA Site
(photograph):

[Refer to PDF for image]

Source: U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt Andrew Moseley.

[End of figure]

ASA units, which include both Air National Guard (ANG) and active
duty
Air Force personnel, are dual tasked to conduct both expeditionary
missions and ASA operations. ASA operations consist of ground
operations that take place before fighter aircraft take off,
including
such activities as maintaining the fighter aircraft. They also
include
those activities that may take place after a unit receives an alert
from NORAD but before the aircraft are airborne. For example, pilots
and maintenance personnel may rush from their nearby lodging facility
to the alert aircraft facility, where maintenance personnel conduct
final preparations while the pilots sit in their aircraft awaiting
further instruction (battle station). Alternatively, pilots may taxi
the aircraft to the end of the runway and await further instruction
(runway alert) or take off in response to the alert (scramble).

Once aircraft take off, "alert" operations end and the operation
becomes a homeland defense air mission under Operation NOBLE EAGLE.
[Footnote 4] When this transition occurs, an ANG pilot converts from
Title 32 status under the command and control of the state governor
to
federal Title 10 status under the command and control of NORAD.
[Footnote 5] If warranted, NORAD can increase personnel, aircraft,
and
the number of ASA sites based on changes in the threat conditions.
According to DOD documents, day-to-day, or steady-state, operations
consist of the current personnel and aircraft at the 18 ASA sites
scattered throughout the United States. This report focuses on the 20
units at the 18 sites that were conducting these steady-state ASA
operations up through September 2008.[Footnote 6]

Given the importance of the capability to deter, detect, and destroy
airborne threats to the United States, it is important that the Air
Force address current and future requirements of the ASA mission to
ensure its long-term sustainability. This includes ASA units' ability
to ensure that units conducting ASA operations are also able to train
for and perform their expeditionary missions. Further, the Air Force
should ensure that it has fighter aircraft available to conduct ASA
operations, since the F-15s and F-16s used for these operations are
beginning to reach the end of their useful service lives.

We have previously reported that one widely accepted method to
effectively determine requirements and manage risk for a mission or
operation is through a five-phase risk management approach.[Footnote
7]
For example, one phase of this approach is a risk assessment phase,
which includes evaluating threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences;
another phase includes evaluating alternatives based on different
costs
and other factors.

In light of these issues, you asked that we review the management of
ASA operations. In conducting our review, we examined the extent to
which (1) NORAD has adopted a risk-based management approach to
determine ASA operational requirements; (2) the Air Force has
implemented ASA operations as a steady-state or ongoing and
indefinite
mission in accordance with NORAD, DOD, and Air Force directives and
guidance;[Footnote 8] (3) the Air Force assesses the readiness of
units
conducting ASA operations; and (4) the Air Force faces challenges in
sustaining ASA operations for the future and what plans, if any, it
has
to address such challenges.

To determine the extent to which NORAD has adopted a risk-based
management approach to determine ASA operational requirements, we
compared a widely accepted risk-based management framework to
assessments that NORAD conducted on ASA operations. To determine the
extent to which the Air Force has implemented ASA operations as a
steady-state mission, we reviewed NORAD, DOD, and Air Force guidance
regarding how ASA operations are to be managed. We also interviewed
DOD
and Air Force officials and obtained ASA documents that contained
information about the management of ASA operations, including
oversight
and funding of the operations. We then compared how the Air Force had
implemented ASA operations to NORAD, DOD, and Air Force guidance. To
determine the extent to which the Air Force assessed the readiness of
units performing ASA operations, we obtained and analyzed DOD
guidance
and reviewed the readiness reports of all units that conduct ASA
operations. We reviewed the readiness reports and interviewed unit
officials and determined how well these reports reflected the extent
to
which these units were organized, trained, and equipped to conduct
ASA
operations. To determine the extent to which the Air Force faces
challenges in sustaining ASA operations for the future and what
plans,
if any, it has to address such challenges, we interviewed DOD and Air
Force officials and obtained and reviewed DOD reports that identified
challenges the Air Force will face in sustaining future ASA
operations.
We also interviewed DOD and Air Force officials and obtained their
views on the challenges they will face, and we requested any plans
addressing these challenges. We also conducted structured interviews
with the commanders of the 20 alert units located at all 18 ASA sites
and asked them to respond to a variety of questions regarding aspects
of all four objectives.[Footnote 9] We conducted this performance
audit
from April 2008 to January 2009 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan
and
perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to
provide
a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our
audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a
reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Additional information on our scope and methodology appears in
appendix
I.

Results in Brief:

While NORAD has performed some risk assessments, it has not adopted a
risk-based management approach to determine ASA operational
requirements. In our prior work on management practices, we noted
that
an on-going, risk-based management approach, which would include
routine risk assessments, could help effectively manage risk and
determine requirements for federal programs. NORAD has completed
three
assessments that we determined could be part of a risk-based
management
approach. NORAD completed the first of these assessments after the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, when it worked with other
federal agencies and determined, based on vulnerabilities and
criticality, which sites should be protected by ASA operations. This
assessment could be considered to be part of the risk assessment
phase
of a risk management approach. NORAD did two other assessments, in
2005
and 2006, primarily in response to the 2005 Base Closure and
Realignment Commission process and efforts to cut costs for Operation
NOBLE EAGLE. On both of these occasions, NORAD conducted a cost
evaluation, taking into consideration aviation security
improvements--
such as secured cockpits and enhanced passenger screening--that were
made by the Transportation Security Administration since 2001.
However,
these assessments were not completed as a result of an established
risk-
based management approach intended to routinely manage risk and
determine operational requirements for ASA operations. Instead, NORAD
performed these assessments in response to individual DOD leadership
inquiries about ASA operations. NORAD has not conducted similar
assessments since 2006 because DOD does not require NORAD to manage
ASA
operations using a risk management approach, which includes routine
risk assessments. By performing routine risk assessments, NORAD could
better evaluate the extent to which previous threats have been
mitigated by DOD or other government agencies, better evaluate
current
and emerging threats to determine which ones require the most urgent
attention, and determine operational requirements to address changing
conditions. Moreover, it could also help NORAD to evaluate
alternatives
to current operations, especially in a resource-restricted
environment.
Further, such assessments could enhance NORAD's ability to determine
and apply the appropriate level and type of resources--including
units,
personnel, and aircraft--for the ASA mission. Therefore, we are
recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander of
the
U.S. command element of NORAD to conduct routine risk assessments to
determine ASA operational requirements.

The Air Force has not implemented ASA operations as a steady-state
(i.e., ongoing and indefinite) mission in accordance with current
NORAD, DOD, and Air Force directives and guidance. In August 2002,
the
Air Force issued planning guidance to establish permanent ASA sites
to
support homeland defense rather than continuing to conduct ASA
actions
on a temporary basis,[Footnote 10] as it had been doing since the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Then, in response to a
December 2002 NORAD declaration of a steady-state air defense
mission,
the Air Force took further action to establish ASA as a steady-state
capability and issued a directive assigning specific functions and
responsibilities to support the mission. According to the directive,
the Air Force was to take 140 actions to implement a steady-state
mission. For example, the directive required the Air Force Deputy
Chief
of Staff for Personnel to ensure that ASA active personnel
requirements
were included in the Air Force submission to the Future Years Defense
Program.[Footnote 11] The directive also required the Air Force major
commands to develop the capability to report on the readiness of ASA
activities in DOD's readiness system, [Footnote 12] and the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Personnel to work with the appropriate officials
to
limit adverse effects on the careers of personnel affected by the
steady-state mission. Further, in December 2003 the Office of the
Secretary of Defense directed the Air Force to assess and resource
long-
term ASA mission requirements in its submission for the 2006 through
2011 Future Years Defense Program.[Footnote 13] However, the Air
Force
has not implemented ASA operations as a steady-state mission because,
(1) according to headquarters Air Force officials, it has focused on
other priorities such as overseas military operations, and (2) it
believed that ASA operational requirements, such as number of sites,
might be decreased to pre-September 11, 2001, levels at some point in
the future. ASA units have thus far carried out these operations when
called upon to do so, but have experienced difficulties since the Air
Force has not implemented ASA as a steady-state mission. For example,
officials at 17 of the 20 ASA units that we interviewed told us their
units were adversely affected by short-term personnel assignments,
uncertainty about the future of the mission, and limited
opportunities
for career advancement. According to ANG officials who coordinate ASA
operations within the National Guard Bureau (NGB/ANG) and unit
officials conducting ASA operations, while implementing ASA as a
steady-
state mission would not solve all of the challenges that the units
must
address, it would help them mitigate some of the challenges
associated
with conducting both their ASA and expeditionary missions, including
uncertainties regarding personnel issues. Such uncertainties in
employment have led to difficulty in recruiting and retaining
personnel. Therefore, we are recommending that DOD establish a
timetable to implement ASA as a steady-state mission, according to
NORAD, DOD, and Air Force guidance; update the Air Force homeland
defense policy, homeland operations doctrine, and concept of
operations
to incorporate and define the roles and responsibilities for ASA
operations; and incorporate the ASA mission within the Air Force
submissions for the 6-year Future Years Defense Program.

While NORAD and PACOM partially assessed the readiness of the units
that carry out ASA operations, the Air Force, as the force provider,
has not evaluated personnel, training, or quantity and quality of
equipment. NORAD conducts two types of assessments that evaluate the
extent to which aircraft are maintained for ASA operations and the
units' ability to respond to an alert and to locate and intercept
aircraft. However, these NORAD evaluations only assess personnel on
duty at the time of the inspection; they do not assess and report the
extent to which all of the unit's personnel involved in the conduct
of
ASA operations are adequately trained. Although the Air Force is
responsible for measuring a unit's readiness to perform its missions
by
evaluating personnel, training, and quantity and quality of
equipment,
it does not assess these factors specifically with respect to ASA
operations. The Air Force has not evaluated these aspects of
readiness
because it has not formally assigned ASA as a mission to the units
and
included it on the units' mission lists,[Footnote 14] which would be
done as part of implementing ASA operations as a steady-state
mission.
Additionally, the Air Force has been focused on other priorities and
headquarters Air Force officials believe that ASA operations might be
decreased to pre-September 11, 2001, levels at some point in the
future. In its comments on a draft of this report DOD pointed out
that
other military services could perform ASA operations when
circumstances
warrant. Therefore, we are recommending that DOD direct the military
services with units that consistently conduct ASA operations to (1)
formally assign ASA duties to these units and (2) ensure that the
readiness of these units is fully assessed, to include personnel,
training, equipment, and ability to respond to an alert.

The Air Force faces two significant challenges to the long-term
sustainability of its ASA capabilities, and has not developed plans
delineating the actions it will take to mitigate these challenges.
First, according to Air Force documents and personnel, many of the
service's aircraft are the oldest in Air Force history, and they have
become more difficult and expensive to maintain over time. For
example,
if aircraft are not replaced within the next few years, our analysis
of
Air Force documentation indicates that 11 of the 18 current ASA sites
could be without viable aircraft by 2020.[Footnote 15] In comments on
a
draft of this report, DOD indicated that extending the service life
of
its F-15 and F-16 aircraft is also an option; however, the Air Force
has yet to determine the extent to which such actions are viable.
Second, while continuing to deploy units for overseas operations and
supporting units that are receiving replacement aircraft, the Air
Force
must ensure that units are trained, available, and ready to perform
ASA
operations. Currently, when ASA units are deployed, unit commanders
typically try to independently find units to replace them, and unit
officials told us that this can be difficult to do. Similarly, 14 of
the 18 current ASA sites will have to suspend ASA operations for a
period of time between 2010 and 2020, as their aircraft reach the end
of their useful service lives or they are equipped with new fighter
aircraft. According to Air Force officials, the Air Force has not
addressed these challenges because it has been focused on other
priorities. Failure to develop detailed plans to address these
challenges could jeopardize the Air Force's ability to protect U.S.
airspace in the future. Therefore, we are recommending that DOD
develop
and implement a plan to address any projected capability gaps in ASA
units due to the expected end of useful service lives of the F-15s
and
F-16s. We are also recommending that DOD develop and implement a
formal
method to replace deploying units that still provides unit commanders
flexibility to coordinate replacements.

DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report. DOD agreed
with some and partially agreed with other recommendations. However,
in
its comments, DOD did not commit to taking actions on the steps we
were
recommending. Therefore, we clarified some of our recommendations. We
clarified our recommendation to use a comprehensive risk-based
management approach in determining ASA operational requirements to
specify the need to routinely conduct risk assessments to better
ensure
ASA operational requirements are appropriately determined. We also
clarified our recommendation to implement ASA as a steady-state
mission
to suggest that the Air Force establish a timetable for implementing
ASA since DOD's response did not set a timetable for doing so.
Regarding assigning ASA duties to Air Force units performing ASA
operations and ensuring their readiness, we clarified the
recommendation to make it clearer that the military services that
have
units consistently conducting ASA operations formally assign ASA
duties
to these units and ensure their readiness to conduct these duties.
Responding to our recommendation that the Air Force develop and
implement a plan to address fighter capability gaps, DOD did not
clearly agree to ensure the fighter gaps we identified would be
addressed in Air Force plans. We continue to believe that our
evidence
supports the need to address these capability gaps in Air Force
planning. Lastly, on our recommendation to develop and implement a
formal method that includes ASA unit commanders' flexibility to
replace
deploying units, we believe DOD's plan should be responsive to our
recommendation, if the ASA mission is formally assigned to the
performing units. A summary of DOD's comments and a summary of our
response to these comments follow the conclusion section of this
report. DOD's written comments are attached to this report as
appendix
II.

Background:

Protecting U.S. airspace has changed over the years. During the Cold
War, DOD focused its air defense operations to protect U.S. airspace
from air threats originating from the former Soviet Union. Today,
several DOD organizations are involved in air defense and ASA
operations, which have expanded to include the defense of U.S.
airspace
from air threats originating from within the United States. Because
ASA
operations are considered the last line of defense against air
threats,
it is crucial for this capability to be functioning.

History of ASA and Current Roles and Responsibilities:

During the Cold War, NORAD positioned fighter aircraft across the
United States and Canada to protect North America from a strategic
attack by Soviet bombers. Alert fighter aircraft were manned by a
dedicated force that was not assigned to other missions, and aircraft
were armed, fueled, and ready at all times. As many as 5,800 aircraft
were on alert in 1958, but the number of aircraft diminished over the
years, as did the number of designated alert sites. By 1997 officials
had suggested a "four corners" defense, maintaining alert sites in
Massachusetts, Oregon, California, and Florida. By September 11,
2001,
only 14 interceptor aircraft were sitting alert in the United States.

According to DOD's 2008 National Defense Strategy and its 2005
Strategy
for Homeland Defense and Civil Support,[Footnote 16] protecting the
U.S. homeland from direct attack is DOD's highest priority. After the
events of September 11, 2001, DOD initiated Operation NOBLE EAGLE,
which shifted NORAD's responsibilities to include protecting U.S.
airspace from air threats originating from within the United States.

NORTHCOM is the military command responsible for executing DOD's
homeland defense and civil support mission within its area of
responsibility--including the continental United States, Alaska, and
territorial waters. The commander of NORTHCOM also commands NORAD.
The
NORAD commander is responsible for the command and control of
homeland
air defense and delegates much of this command and control function
to
one of its three regional commanders.[Footnote 17] Although neither
NORAD nor the Secretary of Defense specifies which military service
must provide fighter aircraft to conduct ASA operations, the Air
Force
is currently providing 100 percent of the fighter aircraft. The Air
Force is responsible for organizing, training, and equipping Air
Force
units. With regard to ASA operations, the Air Force has delegated the
responsibility of organizing, training, and equipping combat-ready
forces to its major commands. Specifically, Air Combat Command is
responsible for providing air defense forces to NORAD and Pacific Air
Forces Command is responsible for providing air defense forces to
Hawaii. Alert forces deployed in Alaska are provided by PACOM. NORAD
has established a binational subcommand under the leadership of a
general officer who is responsible for both NORAD and PACOM
activities.

The commander of First Air Force is also the commander of the
Continental NORAD Region and the Air Forces Northern Command. In each
of these capacities, the commander has different responsibilities
with
regard to ASA operations. For example, as a numbered Air Force
commander (i.e., First Air Force), the commander has the
responsibility
of ensuring the readiness of forces for air sovereignty and air
defense
of the continental United States. As the commander of the Continental
NORAD Region, the commander is responsible for providing airspace
surveillance and control and directing all air sovereignty activities
for the continental United States. The role and responsibilities of
being the commander of Air Forces Northern Command include air
component planning, execution, and assessment of support to civil
authorities (e.g., air operations during hurricane recovery) and
command of air forces in support of NORTHCOM homeland defense
missions.
While the First Air Force, Continental NORAD Region, and Air Forces
Northern Command have these responsibilities, the ASA units that
conduct ASA operations are assigned to different numbered Air Forces
within the Air Force's Air Combat Command, Air Education and Training
Command, or Pacific Air Force Command for their expeditionary
missions.
[Footnote 18]

There are currently 20 units at 18 designated steady-state alert
sites
in the United States, as shown in figure 3. The ANG provides the
personnel and equipment at 16 of the 18 ASA sites while the active
duty
Air Force provides the personnel and equipment at the remaining 2
sites.

Figure 3: Locations of the 18 Steady-State ASA Sites in the United
States as of October 2008:

[Refer to PDF for image]

This figure is a map of the United States indicating the locations of
the 18 steady-state ASA sites in the United States as of October
2008,
as follows:

Burlington[A], Vermont: Home station;
Atlantic City, New Jersey: Home station;
Andrews, Maryland: Home station;
Langley{b}, Virginia: Alert detachment;
Shaw, South Carolina: Home station;
Homestead[C], Florida: Alert detachment;
New Orleans, Louisiana: Home station;
Ellington{d}, Texas: Alert detachment;
Toledo, Ohio: Home station;
Madison, Wisconsin: Home station;
Duluth, Minnesota: Home station;
Buckley, Colorado: Home station;
Tucson, Arizona: Home station;
March[E], California: Alert detachment;
Fresno, California: Home station;
Portland, Oregon: Home station;
Elmendorf, Alaska: Home station;
Hickam, Hawaii: Home station.

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

[A] The Vermont ANG unit at Burlington International Airport is
conducting ASA operations until the Massachusetts ANG unit at Barnes
ANGS assumes responsibility for ASA operations in fiscal year 2010.

[B] A detachment from the Vermont ANG conducts ASA operations at
Langley Air Force Base (AFB), Virginia; the South Dakota ANG unit
from
Sioux Falls is assisting with ASA operations at this site until the
Massachusetts ANG assumes responsibility for the New England ASA
operations in fiscal year 2010.

[C] ASA operations at Homestead AFB, Florida are conducted by a
detachment from the Jacksonville, Florida ANG unit.

[D] ASA operations at Ellington Field, Texas are conducted by a
detachment from the Tulsa, Oklahoma ANG unit.

[E] ASA operations at March Air Reserve Base, California are
conducted
by a detachment from the Fresno, California ANG unit.

[End of figure]

ANG units fulfilling different roles are potentially subject to
different authorities under the United States Code and state laws.
[Footnote 19] ANG units conduct ASA operations in a Title 32 status,
meaning that they are under the command and control of the governor
of
the state but federally funded. However, pilots and aircraft of the
same unit engage in an actual airborne air defense operation in a
Title
10 status, because they are performing a federal mission under the
command and control of NORAD. Active duty units are always in a Title
10 status, but command and control of pilots and aircraft conducting
ASA operations passes from the local commander to NORAD when
performing
air defense operations, as shown in figure 4.

Figure 4: Differences Between ASA Operations and Homeland Defense Air
Missions:

[Refer to PDF for image]

This figure includes photographs and descriptive information on the
differences between ASA Operations and Homeland Defense Air Missions,
as follows:

Air Sovereignty Alert Operations:

[Photograph of F-16 sitting alert at Langley, VA ASA site]

Fully fueled, fully armed fighter aircraft sitting alert 24 hours a
day
for 365 days a year.

* Command and control of personnel and equipment remains with the
local
commander.

* Costs to maintain alert are supposed to be funded through unit’s
normal funding methods.

* Air National Guard personnel are in Title 32 status. Active duty
personnel are in Title 10 status.

Homeland Defense Air Missions:

[Photograph of F-15 aircraft scrambles at Hickam, HI ASA site]

An alert aircraft transitions from ASA operations to homeland defense
air operations when it takes off in response to an alert or for
scheduled and random air patrols at important national events and
public gatherings.

* Command and control of personnel and equipment transition to NORAD
command structure.

* Units pay for costs to scramble against “real world threats” while
Air Force may reimburse units for training or scheduled air patrols,
such as the Super Bowl.

* Air National Guard personnel transition to and active duty
personnel
remain in Title 10 status.

Source: GAO analysis; U.S. Air Force photos by (F-16) Technical Sgt
William Parks, (F-15) Master Sgt Kristen Stanley.

[End of figure]

Because ASA units are dual tasked for their expeditionary missions
and
ASA operations, other units fill in to conduct ASA operations when an
ASA unit deploys. ANG units can, on their own, find replacements.
Finding replacement for a unit's ASA operation can entail finding
personnel and aircraft from multiple units.

Risk-Based Management:

GAO has previously reported that a risk-based management approach
helps
policymakers make informed decisions and prioritize resource
investments. Risk-based management is a widely endorsed strategy for
helping decision makers make decisions about allocating finite
resources and taking action under conditions of uncertainty. We have
previously recommended a five-phase approach to risk-based management
as shown in table 1.

Table 1: A Five-Phase Risk-Based Management Framework[A]:

Phase: Strategic goals, objectives, and constraints;
Description: Addresses what the strategic goals are attempting to
achieve and the steps needed to attain those results;
Example of elements:
* Overall results desired, i.e., "end state";
* Hierarchy of strategic goals and subordinate objectives related to
those goals;
* Specific activities to achieve results;
* Priorities, milestones, and outcome-related performance measures;
* Limitations or constraints that affect outcomes.

Phase: Risk assessment;
Description: Addresses identification of key elements of potential
risks so that countermeasures can be selected and implemented to
prevent or mitigate their effects;
Example of elements:
* Analysis of threat gained from available sources (This threat
information will be used to develop scenarios. See below);
* Estimation of vulnerability of an asset based on standards, such
as;
- availability/predictability;
- accessibility;
- countermeasures in place, and;
- target hardness;
* Identification of consequence of a terrorist attack on a specific
asset and criticality, or the relative importance, of the asset
involved.

Phase: Alternatives evaluation;
Description: Addresses the evaluation of alternative countermeasures
to
reduce risk being considered with associated costs;
Example of elements:
* Specific countermeasure(s) to reduce risk;
* Use of external sources to improve decision making, such as
consultation with experts and threat scenarios;
* Cost-benefit analysis of countermeasure(s).

Phase: Management selection;
Description: Addresses where resources and investments will be made
based on alternatives evaluation and other management criteria, such
as
availability of funds;
Example of elements:
* Management's preferences and value judgments associated with
expenditure of countermeasures and funds, such as distribution of
antiterrorism measures over assets;
* Organizational risk tolerance;
* Resource allocations;
* Documentation of decisions, including rationale.

Phase: Implementation and monitoring;
Description: Addresses how countermeasures will be applied and
mechanism to keep security measures updated;
Example of elements:
* Implementation of countermeasures according to strategy;
* Periodic testing of countermeasures;
* Linkages to other risk management strategies, state, local, or
private entities (horizontal);
* Linkages to other strategies, both departmental and national
(vertical);
* Mechanisms for alterations in system based on current threat data;
* Periodic evaluation to assess efficiency and effectiveness of
program.

Source: GAO.

[A] GAO, Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks
and Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical
Infrastructure, GAO-06-91 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 2005).

[End of table]

The framework should be considered a starting point, and the entire
cycle of risk-based management activities should be viewed as a goal.
The process is dynamic and new information can be entered at any
phase.
The framework can be used to inform agency officials and decision
makers of the basic components of a risk-based management system or
can
be used as a stand-alone guide. The risk-based management approach as
outlined above is designed to be flexible, in that the approach may
be
applied at various organizational levels from a department or a
multiagency organization down to specific projects or operations such
as ASA operations.

As we previously reported, because there is no one uniformly accepted
approach to risk-based management, terms and activities may differ
across applications. In addition, any approach that omits the
substance
of the steps may result in resources that are not targeted to the
highest security needs. We also reported that failing to monitor the
implementation of countermeasures, including those implemented by
other
agencies, may result in a misallocation of resources. Similarly,
failing to conduct routine or periodic assessments of programs or
operations could result in missed opportunities to increase their
efficiency and effectiveness.

NORAD Has Assessed ASA Operational Requirements but Not on a Routine
Basis as Part of a Risk-Based Management Approach:

We identified three NORAD assessments of ASA operations; however,
NORAD
did not perform these assessments--or conduct other actions that
would
be part of a risk-based management approach--on a routine basis.
According to our prior work, an ongoing risk-based management
approach
is a best practice that enhances an organization's decision making,
including determining operational requirements, and helps to guide
the
use of limited resources. A critical phase of implementing a risk-
based
management approach is the risk assessment phase, which helps
decision
makers identify and evaluate potential risks facing key assets or
missions so that countermeasures can be designed and implemented to
prevent or mitigate the effects of the risks. In addition to the risk
assessment phase, alternatives to current requirements are evaluated
while considering cost and other factors in the alternatives
evaluation
phase. Rather than performing these assessments as part of an adopted
comprehensive management approach to manage risk or determine ASA
operational requirements, NORAD performed these assessments in
response
to individual DOD leadership inquiries about ASA operations. While
NORAD is not required to conduct risk assessments on a routine basis,
doing so could allow it to enhance its ability to determine the
appropriate level and types of resources--including units, personnel,
and aircraft--for ASA operations.

In the first assessment we identified, after the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, NORAD, in working with other U.S. government
agencies, developed a list of what it believed to be the most
critical
locations and infrastructure across the United States requiring its
protection. We determined this assessment could be considered as part
of the risk assessment phase of the overall risk management approach
in
which vulnerabilities and critical assets are evaluated. NORAD has
not
reevaluated this list since it created it in 2001 even though
according
to experts in the intelligence community, the type of threat has and
continues to evolve, and other U.S. agencies have taken a number of
measures to mitigate against aviation threats.

We identified a second assessment that NORAD conducted in 2005 that
we
considered could be part of the alternatives evaluation phase in
which
alternatives are considered. Specifically, NORAD's air component--
First Air Force--provided input to the 2005 BRAC process regarding
which sites it would prefer to conduct ASA operations. First Air
Force
measured how long it would take a fighter plane to respond to a
threat
over a specific location--both from the current ASA site and from the
proposed alternative sites--and the level of risk that would be posed
under each alternative.[Footnote 20] After the BRAC decisions were
made
in 2005, First Air Force assessed the impact of the commission's
decisions on ASA operations. For example, the commission recommended
that ASA operations at Selfridge, Michigan, be transferred to Toledo,
Ohio. First Air Force evaluated the impact of response times to cover
high population centers and infrastructure in the area.

In the third assessment we identified, in 2006 the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, requested that NORAD and other commands
evaluate
costs and identify measures to reduce Operation NOBLE EAGLE costs. We
considered this assessment could also be included in the alternatives
evaluation phase of a risk management approach. In this third
assessment, NORAD identified a number of classified actions that it
could take to reduce the cost of Operation NOBLE EAGLE but stated
that
in order to continue to fully support the homeland air defense
mission,
it would be necessary to maintain the current number of ASA sites
based
on proximity to critical infrastructure. NORAD's assessment included
a
risk-based assessment of ASA requirements based on current and
emerging
threats. The assessment also took into consideration aviation
security
improvements that had been made by other federal entities since 2001,
for example, the Transportation Security Administration's use of
Federal Air Marshals on selected flights. NORAD has not undertaken an
assessment of alternatives since 2006.

In prior work, we have reported that the goal of risk-based
management
is to integrate systematic concern for risk into the existing cycle
of
agency decision making and implementation. Adopting such a risk-based
management approach could help NORAD to better assess risk and
determine operational requirements by addressing vulnerabilities and
by
presenting alternatives that could be implemented to address changing
conditions. Adopting a risk-based management approach to include
actions in all five phases, could also allow NORAD to evaluate the
extent to which previous threats have been mitigated by DOD or other
government agencies and to evaluate current and emerging threats to
determine which ones require the most urgent attention. Routine risk
assessments could help NORAD evaluate the extent to which current ASA
operational requirements--including the levels and types of sites,
forces and equipment, and contributions from other DOD and non-DOD
organizations--are needed to address threats as conditions change.
NORAD officials stated that it has not adopted a risk-based
management
approach primarily because DOD does not require NORAD to use a risk-
based management approach to determine ASA operational requirements.
The use of a risk-based management approach could help NORAD to
assure
DOD, Congress, and others that it has considered risks in making
decisions about how to apply the level and types of capabilities and
resources needed to conduct the ASA mission in an increasingly
constrained fiscal environment. Air Force and NORAD officials
responsible for ASA operations acknowledged that an ongoing cycle of
risk-based management, including a routine risk assessment of ASA
operational requirements, would be beneficial to both the service and
the command.

The Air Force Has Not Implemented ASA Operations as a Steady-State
Mission in Accordance with NORAD, DOD, and Air Force Directives and
Guidance:

The Air Force has not implemented ASA operations as a steady-state
mission in accordance with NORAD, DOD, and Air Force directives and
guidance because it (1) has focused on other priorities and (2)
believes that ASA operational requirements, such as the number of
sites, might be decreased to pre-September 11, 2001, levels in the
future. As a result, ASA units have experienced difficulties in
conducting ASA operations and Congress and DOD lack cost visibility
for
decision making. Implementing ASA operations as a steady-state
mission
may help to mitigate these challenges. In addition, if ASA operations
are not implemented as a steady-state mission, Congress and DOD
leaders
will not have visibility of costs and other important information to
make decisions for these homeland defense operations.

The Air Force Does Not Operate ASA as a Steady-State Mission:

Although its units are conducting ASA operations, the Air Force has
not
implemented these operations as a steady-state mission in accordance
with NORAD, DOD, and Air Force directives and guidance. Specifically,
in August 2002 the Air Force convened a working group that issued
guidance for planning to establish permanent ASA sites in support of
the mission in support of homeland defense rather than continuing to
establish sites on a temporary basis, as it has since the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001. In addition, in response to a December
2002 NORAD declaration of a steady-state air defense mission, the Air
Force took further action in February 2003 to establish ASA as a
steady-
state capability by issuing a directive assigning specific functions
and responsibilities to support the mission.[Footnote 21] This
directive identified 140 separate actions[Footnote 22] to be taken by
Air Force organizations to support the steady-state mission at all 18
ASA sites; these actions included addressing personnel, equipment,
funding, and facility issues. For example, the directive required the
Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel to ensure that ASA
active
personnel requirements were included in the Air Force submission to
the
Future Years Defense Program. This program is one of the principal
tools used to inform DOD senior leaders and Congress about resources
planned to support various programs, and reflects DOD decisions
regarding allocation of federal resources. The directive required the
Air Force Major Commands to develop the capability to report on the
readiness of ASA activities in DOD's readiness system, and the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Personnel to work with the appropriate officials
to
limit adverse effects on the careers of personnel affected by the
steady-state mission. In addition, it required the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Air and Space Operations to provide policy and programming
guidance and staff necessary issues through appropriate offices.
Further, in December 2003, the Office of the Secretary of Defense
directed the Air Force to assess and resource long-term ASA mission
requirements in its submission for the 2006 through 2011 Future Years
Defense Program.

Although NORAD, DOD, and the Air Force issued directives and guidance
to establish a steady-state ASA mission, the Air Force did not take
the
steps needed to establish the mission. For example, although the
Office
of the Secretary of Defense directed the Air Force to program ASA
operations across the 6 years of its Future Years Defense Program
submission, the Air Force decided to program ASA operations in 2-year
increments. Air Force, NORAD, and NGB/ANG officials told us that this
decision has been the primary cause for the personnel difficulties
ASA
units are experiencing. Headquarters Air Force officials told us that
they made this decision because they believed that the number of
sites
might decrease to the pre-September 11, 2001, levels and placing ASA
operations across all 6 years would require the Air Force to offset
another service program. However, Air Force officials also
acknowledged
that they could still have programmed it across the 6-year time frame
since the Future Years Defense Program is a planning tool that could
be
modified if the number of sites were decreased in the future.
[Footnote
23] In addition, the Air Force did not fully fund ASA operations in
the
two previous 2-year programming cycles. For example, the Air Force
did
not program for 122 of the 922 ANG personnel (13 percent) identified
as
being needed to conduct ASA operations for fiscal years 2006 and 2007
and did not program for 150 of the 922 ANG personnel (16 percent)
identified as being needed to conduct ASA operations for fiscal years
2008 and 2009. As a result, the Air Force had to use temporary funds
and temporary orders to cover these personnel shortfalls since they
are
necessary to conduct ASA operations. According to headquarters Air
Force officials, the Air Force focused on other priorities, such as
overseas military operations; furthermore, it believed that future
ASA
operational requirements might be decreased to pre-September 11,
2001,
levels. These officials stated that the lack of implementation was
also
attributable to a lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities
in
Air Force homeland defense documents, and a limited corporate
understanding of ASA operations and the units performing them. Our
analysis showed that none of the Air Force's key homeland defense
documents--the Air Force homeland defense policy directive, the Air
Force homeland operations doctrine, and the Air Force homeland
defense
concept of operations--fully defines the roles and responsibilities
for
or accurately articulates the complexity of ASA operations.[Footnote
24] For example, the Air Force's homeland defense policy directive,
which is supposed to provide overarching guidance to enable the Air
Force to organize, train, and equip by applying the principles,
capabilities, and competencies of air and space power to homeland
defense, does not mention or define ASA operations or outline the
roles
and responsibilities for managing these operations. In addition, the
Air Force's homeland defense office, which was responsible for
overseeing the implementation of the homeland defense directive, lost
its general officer, was downsized, and organizationally realigned
several times shortly after the directive was issued.

Temporary Status of ASA Operations Creates Difficulties for Units and
Hampers Cost Visibility and Oversight:

Since the Air Force did not implement ASA operations in accordance
with
NORAD, DOD, and Air Force guidance, at the time of our review ASA
units
were experiencing a number of difficulties that challenged their
ability to perform both their expeditionary missions and ASA
operations. The unit commanders we interviewed identified funding,
personnel, and dual tasking of responsibilities as the top three
factors affecting ASA operations. Figure 5 depicts units' responses
regarding difficulties they have experienced in conducting ASA
operations. For example, during our structured interviews, officials
from 17 of the 20 units[Footnote 25] stated that personnel issues
were
a moderate or great concern and that recruiting, retention, and
promotion limitations were the primary issues arising from the 2-year
programming for ASA operations. Commanders at the ASA sites that we
visited told us that they had lost some of their most experienced
personnel due to job instability caused by the manner in which ASA
operations are programmed. Similarly, commanders at 17 of the 20
units
stated that the Air Force treats ASA operations as temporary and has
not provided sufficient resources. This situation has resulted in an
increase in the unit's administrative and support requirements. For
example, units are required to issue temporary orders for personnel
as
funds become available. The need to issue such orders would not be
necessary if the operations were not treated as temporary. Thirteen
of
the 20 units indicated that dual tasking--for their expeditionary
mission and for ASA operations--was a moderate or great concern and
that the Air Force was not adequately equipping units to conduct both
missions. Headquarters Air Force and NGB/ANG officials acknowledged
the
units' difficulties in conducting ASA operations.

Figure 5: Factors Identified by ASA Unit Commanders as Moderately or
Greatly Impacting Units' Ability to Conduct ASA Operations:

[Refer to PDF for image]

This figure is a vertical bar graph depicting the following data:

Factors Identified by ASA Unit Commanders as Moderately or Greatly
Impacting Units' Ability to Conduct ASA Operations:

Factor: Personnel issues[A];
Indicated as a moderate or great factor by units: 17 (85%).

Factor: Funding;
Indicated as a moderate or great factor by units: 17 (85%).

Factor: Dual tasking;
Indicated as a moderate or great factor by units: 13 (65%).

Factor: F-15 grounding;
Indicated as a moderate or great factor by units: 12 (60%).

Factor: Demands for multiple inspections;
Indicated as a moderate or great factor by units: 11 (55%).

Factor: Normal training[B];
Indicated as a moderate or great factor by units: 11 (55%).

Factor: Overseas deployments;
Indicated as a moderate or great factor by units: 10 (50%).

Factor: Facilities;
Indicated as a moderate or great factor by units: 9 (45%).

Factor: Posture requirements[C];
Indicated as a moderate or great factor by units: 6 (30%).

Factor: Replacing other ASA units;
Indicated as a moderate or great factor by units: 3 (15%).

Factor: Other;
Indicated as a moderate or great factor by units: 1 (5%).

Source: GAO analysis of structured interviews with ASA units.

Note: The percentages shown represent the percentage of the 20 ASA
units that identified the factors as moderate or great factors.

[A] Includes consideration of 2-year assignments, promotion
opportunities, career progression, and other personnel issues as
indicated by units.

[B] Normal training conducted for their expeditionary mission.

[C] Can include the number and quality of aircraft and personnel that
are on alert 24 hours a day, 365 days a year as well as other posture
requirements.

[End of figure]

Because the Air Force has not programmed for ASA operations in its
Future Years Defense Program submissions, the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, NORAD, and Congress lack visibility into the costs of
these
operations.[Footnote 26] Implementing ASA operations as a steady-
state
mission may help to mitigate these challenges. In addition,
implementing ASA operations as a steady-state mission would provide
Congress and DOD leaders cost visibility into ASA operations, which
support DOD's high-priority homeland defense mission.

Readiness of Units Performing ASA Operations is Partially Assessed by
NORAD and PACOM but Not by the Air Force:

DOD is to evaluate personnel, training, and quantity and quality of
equipment to determine the readiness of units to perform their
missions. NORAD and PACOM partially assessed the readiness of the
units
that carry out ASA operations. For example, NORAD assessed the
quantity
and quality of available fighter aircraft and the ability of the
personnel to respond to an alert on the day it conducted the
assessment. However, NORAD only assessed personnel on duty at the
time
of the inspection and did not assess the extent to which all of the
unit's personnel that are involved with ASA operations are trained to
support and conduct these operations. Moreover, the Air Force, as the
force provider, did not evaluate personnel, training, or the quantity
and quality of equipment needed and used for ASA operations because
it
has not formally assigned the mission to the units.

NORAD conducts two separate assessments of ASA equipment (such as the
condition of the fighter aircraft) and operations (unit's ability to
respond to different types of alerts). The first is a preasssessment
conducted by the Continental NORAD Region commander. This
preassessment
evaluates the quality of alert aircraft, to include the overall
condition of the aircraft, and the units' ability to respond to
different air sovereignty scenarios, such as intercepting various
types
of aircraft. This preassessment is performed prior to the official
ASA
assessment that NORAD headquarters conducts. For example, in a March
2008 preassessment, Continental NORAD Region evaluated the New
Orleans
ASA site's aircraft condition and the unit's ability to respond to
different scenarios within specified time frames. In the second type
of
assessment, NORAD officially evaluates, generally every 20 months,
the
sites using the same factors as the preassessment. In the April 2008
official assessment of the New Orleans ASA site, NORAD evaluated its
ability to respond to aircraft flown by pilots who had not filed
flight
plans and were not responding to Air Force pilot signals to land.
NORAD
found that New Orleans site personnel were able to perform ASA
operations under this and other scenarios. In examining these
assessments, we observed that NORAD did not evaluate and report the
extent to which all of the unit's personnel involved with ASA
operations are trained to support and conduct these operations. PACOM
conducts a similar assessment for the ASA unit located at Hickham Air
Force Base (AFB), Hawaii. As a result, these assessments do not
reflect
the complete readiness of the units that conduct ASA operations.

The Air Force, as the force provider, is responsible for measuring
readiness for its missions by evaluating personnel, training, and
quantity and quality of equipment; however, it did not assess these
factors specific to ASA operations.[Footnote 27] NORAD officials
stated
training for ASA operations is especially important given the
differences in conducting wartime flight operations overseas versus
conducting ASA operations in the United States. ASA commanders stated
that ASA training includes specific tactics, techniques, and
procedures
that are not always included during their wartime training. As a
result, they stated that many of the units have constructed their own
ASA training plans to ensure their personnel are adequately trained
to
perform ASA operations. In addition, the Air Force has not evaluated
the number of personnel it needs for ASA operations; however, NGB/ANG
officials told us they are reviewing the number of personnel the ANG
needs to perform ASA operations. The officials told us that they were
uncertain as to when this assessment would be completed.

Our structured interviews with the commanders of units that conduct
ASA
operations showed that they did not evaluate and report the
personnel,
training, or quantity and quality of equipment to perform ASA
operations because the Air Force has not formally assigned ASA as a
mission to the units and it has not declared the operations as a
steady-
state mission. [Footnote 28] Additionally, according to headquarters
Air Force officials, the Air Force has been focused on other
priorities, such as overseas military operations and it believed that
ASA operational requirements, such as number of sites, might be
decreased to pre-September 11, 2001, levels. Formally assigning ASA
operations to the units would require the units to fully assess their
readiness--personnel, training, and quantity and quality of equipment-
-to perform ASA operations. DOD officials told us that other military
services could perform ASA operations when circumstances warrant. By
assigning the mission to those units that consistently conduct the
mission--regardless of the services they represent--and assessing the
extent to which they have the personnel, training, and equipment to
conduct this mission, DOD would be better informed about the
readiness
of ASA units.

ASA Operations Face Significant Challenges to Long-Term
Sustainability,
but the Air Force Has Not Developed Plans to Mitigate These
Challenges:

We identified two key challenges to sustaining ASA operations over
the
long term. However, the Air Force does not have plans to manage or
deal
with these key challenges. First, our analysis of Air Force documents
and statements from Air Force officials familiar with the service's
recapitalization efforts indicates that even if aging aircraft are
replaced according to Air Force aircraft schedules, gaps in fighter
aircraft at current ASA sites will arise within the next 7 years.
Specifically, by fiscal year 2020, 11 of the 18 current ASA sites
could
be without viable[Footnote 29] aircraft to conduct ASA operations.
[Footnote 30] Second, the Air Force must ensure that units are
available and ready to perform ASA operations and support units
receiving replacement aircraft, while simultaneously continuing to
deploy units for overseas operations. Currently, when ASA units are
deployed, the ANG must find units to replace them, which officials
told
us can be difficult. While Air Force officials have acknowledged the
challenges we identified to the long-term sustainability of ASA
operations, they have not developed plans to address them because the
service has been focused on other priorities, such as overseas
operations. Plans would provide the Air Force with information that
could assist it in its efforts to ensure long-term sustainability of
ASA operations and the capability of ASA units to protect U.S.
airspace.

Expected Retirements of Aging Aircraft Will Create a Challenge in
Sustaining the ASA Mission:

According to Air Force documents and personnel, many aircraft in the
service's current inventory are the oldest in Air Force history, and
the older they get the more difficult and expensive they are