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本贴由【无定河边骨】于2006-12-20 10:51:03发表于鼎盛中华。
《建设一支面向未来的部队》中英文对照版——美空战司令部司令官专访，《Air Force》杂志2006年12月期刊
By Robert S. Dudney, Editor in Chief
作者：罗伯特·S.·达得尼， 总编
《Air Force》 December 2006, Vol. 89, No. 12
《空军》杂志 2006年12月，89期，12页
A Force For the Long Run
Some new emphasis on irregular threats was warranted, but overcorrection can be dangerous.
标题：建设一支面向未来的部队
内容提要：对非常规威胁进行一些强调是需要的，但纠枉过正就变得危险了。
The political ghost of Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, who resigned under fire on Nov. 8, will haunt the Pentagon for some time. He has put a deep imprint on the place. For the Air Force, that legacy is not altogether positive.
国防部长拉姆斯菲尔德11月8号宣布准备下台了，但他的政策幽灵某些时候仍将在五角大楼里神出鬼没。他在这里留下了深刻的烙印。对于空军来说，这种痕迹并不完全都是正面的。
His thinking was evident in the Pentagon’s latest Quadrennial Defense Review, unveiled this year. Rumsfeld, greatly influenced by wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, shifted DOD emphasis away from “traditional” conflict—that is, against nation-states—toward war with “irregular” forces such as terrorists, insurgents, and guerrillas.
在今年发表的五角大楼《四年国防报告》里充满了拉姆斯菲尔德的思想。由于受到伊拉克和阿富汗战事的深刻影响，他让国防部的重心偏离了“传统”冲突——这里
指的是，针对国家政权的斗争——而转向了与恐怖分子、贩毒人员、以及游击队这些“非正规”武装的战争。
Low-intensity conflict, the QDR said, is now the “dominant form of warfare.” Fighters and other advanced weapons were of relatively less value. The services would have to adjust accordingly.
《四年国防报告》里说，低强度的冲突现在“成为了战争的主要形式。”战斗机和其它先进武器的价值相对变小了。军队必须做出相应的调整。
Every transition is also an opportunity. With Rumsfeld’s power now at an end, his successor may want to reconsider that QDR decision, at least as it pertains to the Air Force. The question is this: Has DOD overemphasized irregular warfare?
每一次的人事变换都也是一个机会。随着拉姆斯菲尔德权力的终结，他的继任者也许会重新考虑《四年国防报告》里的决定，至少是有关空军的部分。现在的问题是这样的：国防部是否过份强调了非常规战争？
One who thinks a great deal about that issue is Gen. Ronald E. Keys, head of USAF’s Air Combat Command at Langley AFB, Va. As the ACC boss, he’s in charge of some 1,100 aircraft, 25 wings, 15 bases, and 105,000 troops and civilians. He has no choice but to take the long view, and thus his words have special weight.
罗纳德·E.·基斯将军是对此话题十分关心的人员之一，他是弗吉尼亚州兰利空军基地美国空军空战司令部的最高首长。做为空战司令部的老板，他掌管着将近1100架飞机，25个联队，15个基地，以及10万5千人的官兵和文职人员。他不能不做长远的打算，他的话也因此而有着特殊的份量。
“I think there is a danger, and we worry about that,” Keys told the Defense Writers Group, a gathering of Pentagon reporters, on Nov. 9 in Washington, D.C. “Across the Air Force—particularly in Air Combat Command—I had better be able to fight tonight, and I’ve got to be able to fight 30 years from now, too.”
“我认为危险是存在的，我们对此表示担忧，”基斯11月9日在华盛顿五角大楼向国防部作家协会说，它是五角大楼新闻工作者的一个组织。“就整个空军——特别是在空战司令部的职责范围——来说，我不但要能够在今晚升空作战，我还必须要能够在今后30年里继续战斗。”
Iraq and Afghanistan aren’t the only wars to consider. “You’ve got to be able to fight in North Korea,” he said. “You’ve got to be able to defend in the China-Taiwan Strait. You’ve got to be able to go to Iran.” Such scenarios would entail high-intensity clashes with large national forces. Those nations could be defeated only by a technologically advanced “conventional” military.
伊拉克和阿富汗并不是唯一需要考虑的战争。“你还必须要能够在北朝鲜作战，”他说。“你还必须要能够保卫台湾海峡。你还必须要对付伊朗。”这些场合下将不可避免地与大量的国家军队产生高强度的碰撞。这些国家只能被一支技术先进的“传统”军队打败。
Keys has said before that the Air Force is spending a lot of time “trying to find one white SUV racing down the road” in Iraq. He went on to say, “When you get to Korea, your problem is not finding one white SUV; your problem’s going to be 1,000 tubes of artillery shelling Seoul. It’s going to be four tank armies.”
基斯此前曾说过空军在伊拉克花费了太多的时间去“试图沿着公路找到一辆白色的SUV汽车”。他对此继续说道，“当你进入朝鲜时，你面临的问题不是去寻找一辆白色的SUV汽车；你的问题是有将近1000根将对首尔进行轰击的炮管。那里有４个的坦克军。”
Keys said USAF needs versatile platforms, equally good in a permissive environment or a “kick-down-the-door” scenario. The stealthy F-22 Raptor fits the bill to a T, but Rumsfeld imposed a drastic cut—reducing the buy from the 381 that USAF considered the minimum requirement to only 183 today.
基斯说美国空军需要多用途的平台，能够良好地适用于一个宽松的环境或是需要“破门而入”的场合。F-22猛禽隐形战斗机的表现与它的帐单很相配，但拉姆斯菲尔德却对它进行了大量的裁剪——它的采购数量从美国空军认为的最少保有量381架减少到了今天的183架。
“I’ve got 183 of ’em; that’s what I plan to live with,” snapped Keys, when asked if the Air Force would seek more. “I need 381. I can afford 183.”
“我只能得到183架的F-22；我准备勉强接受它，”当问到空军是否将争取更多的的F-22时，基斯斟字酌句地说。“我需要381架。但我能够接受183架的决定。”
Legacy aircraft such as the F-15 won’t carry the mail indefinitely, either. “It’s got a score of 108 to nothing in combat,” Keys observed, “but it won’t be 108 to nothing in combat for the next 30 years.”
诸如F-15这些原有的作战飞机也是前途未卜。“F-15曾经在空战中创造了108比0的记录，”基斯评述说，“但在未来30年的空战里它不会再有108比0的记录了。”
Ironically, Keys noted, modern fighters are ideal even for low-intensity war. “With the F-22 or the F-35,” said Keys, “you have the ability to get in where people don’t see them, the ability to listen where people don’t know you’re listening, and to find things that people don’t want found.” Many ignore this reality, however.
具有讽刺意味的是，基斯指出现代战斗机也是低强度战争的理想装备。“有了F-22或者是F-35,”基斯说，“你就拥有了在不为人知的情况下活动的能力，有了在别人不知道的情况下进行窃听的能力，以及找到那些人们不想让你找到的东西。”但是，一些人却无视这些事实。
USAF will continue to seek high-end, adaptable weaponry. That will at times bring the service into conflict with “people who think you are too sophisticated and you’ve got too much technological overmatch,” said Keys. Success is not assured.
美国空军将继续寻求高端、适用的军备。基斯表示，偶尔也会让部队介入与“认为你很狡猾并且拥有太多技术优势的人”的冲突中。胜负并不总是确定的。
The centrality of irregular warfare is exerting a worrisome influence on the Air Force in another, indirect way—through confusion over Air Force and Army roles and missions.
以非常规战争为中心正在从另一方面以一种间接的方式对空军产生令人不安的影响——它使空军和陆军的角色及任务完全混乱了。
The problem stems from the Pentagon’s large-scale diversion of USAF airmen into missions normally performed by Army soldiers—the so-called “in-lieu-of” taskings. Thousands of airmen are filling in for Army troops. This has been done to allow the ground service to fight in Iraq and Afghanistan even as it remakes itself into a lighter, more mobile force at home.
问题产生的原因在于五角大楼大范围地将美国空军的官兵投入到通常应该由陆军士兵履行的任务中——因此这也就被人称之为“代替”任务。成千上万的空军官兵被充实到陆军部队中。这样做就是要允许陆军在伊拉克和阿富汗作战的同时还能够在家里把自己重组成一支更轻型，更具有机动性的部队。
“We have a problem,” said Keys. “I’m spending money to train people in skills that I don’t maintain in the United States Air Force.” Example: Airmen driving 50-caliber gun trucks in Iraqi convoys, or airmen serving as volunteer interrogators.
“我们有一个问题，”基斯说。“我花了很多的金钱训练官兵的技能，而这些技能对于美国空军来说是不需要的。”举例来说：空军官兵在伊拉克运输队的卡车上操纵50口径的机枪，或者义务充当审讯人员。
He notes that ACC security forces, in any 12-month period, are deployed to Iraq for six months and prepping for the next deployment for two months—eight months in all—making it hard to meet ACC’s own needs. When it comes to explosive ordnance disposal specialists, truck drivers, and combat engineers, the story is much the same.
他指出空战司令部安全部队每12个月就要部署到伊拉克6个月并且还要为下一次的部署进行为期两个月的练习——加在一起一共是8个月——这些任务与空战司令部的需要几乎毫无关联。当他们成为爆破军火处理专家，卡车司机，以及战斗工兵时，情形基本上是一样的。
Providing “outside-the-wire” base security poses a special problem. “I’m paying for light infantry and getting armored fighting vehicles for my folks,” said Keys. “The question is, should I be doing that against all of the other things I should be doing?” Inevitably, Air Force readiness is diminished.
提供“铁丝网之外”的基地安全产生了一个特殊的问题。“我正在为轻装步兵和为我的官兵装备装甲战斗车辆付钱，”基斯说，“现在的问题是，我应该把钱从我应该投入的方向转移出来，转而用在这些方面么？”不可避免地，空军的战备完好程度降低了。
The ACC chief knows his remarks aren’t welcome everywhere. According to Keys, “These are unpopular questions that people don’t like to speak about, but the unspeakable will happen, whether you speak about it or not.”
这位空战司令部的最高长官知道他的评论在哪都不受欢迎。按照基斯的原话说，“这些问题都是人们不愿提及的话题，但不被谈论的事情也仍要发生，不管你是不是在讨论它。”
The bedrock of current US military doctrine is “full spectrum dominance”—the ability to defeat the enemy at any point on the ladder of escalation. It hinges on the ability to control the skies, swiftly defeat an invading enemy, and rapidly take the fight to the adversary. It requires, in a word, airpower.
当前美国的军事理论的基础是“全面主宰”——即在各个阶段的任何方向上拥有打败敌人的能力。这种能力的关键在于控制天空，快速击败入侵的敌人，并且迅速将战斗转入到敌方境内。用一个词来形容这种需要，就是制空权。
That is worth remembering. Some new emphasis on irregular threats was warranted, but overcorrection can be dangerous, and it is not easy to know when that has happened.
这是值得牢记于心的。对非常规威胁进行一些强调是需要的，但纠枉过正就变得危险了，而且要知道这种强调什么时候过头了并不是那么的容易。
“How will you know?” asked Keys. “You only know if you screw it up when a war happens. That’s the hard part. There’s no metric out there that tells you you’ve got exactly the right force.”
“你怎么才能知道呢？”基斯反问道。“你只有在战争发生的时候切身体会到才会知道原来的分寸掌握的是否合适。这是很困难的。并没有一个公制刻度摆在那来告诉你是不是已经拥有了一支非常合适的部队。“
《建设一支面向未来的部队》中英文对照版——美空战司令部司令官专访，《Air Force》杂志2006年12月期刊
By Robert S. Dudney, Editor in Chief
作者：罗伯特·S.·达得尼， 总编
《Air Force》 December 2006, Vol. 89, No. 12
《空军》杂志 2006年12月，89期，12页
A Force For the Long Run
Some new emphasis on irregular threats was warranted, but overcorrection can be dangerous.
标题：建设一支面向未来的部队
内容提要：对非常规威胁进行一些强调是需要的，但纠枉过正就变得危险了。
The political ghost of Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, who resigned under fire on Nov. 8, will haunt the Pentagon for some time. He has put a deep imprint on the place. For the Air Force, that legacy is not altogether positive.
国防部长拉姆斯菲尔德11月8号宣布准备下台了，但他的政策幽灵某些时候仍将在五角大楼里神出鬼没。他在这里留下了深刻的烙印。对于空军来说，这种痕迹并不完全都是正面的。
His thinking was evident in the Pentagon’s latest Quadrennial Defense Review, unveiled this year. Rumsfeld, greatly influenced by wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, shifted DOD emphasis away from “traditional” conflict—that is, against nation-states—toward war with “irregular” forces such as terrorists, insurgents, and guerrillas.
在今年发表的五角大楼《四年国防报告》里充满了拉姆斯菲尔德的思想。由于受到伊拉克和阿富汗战事的深刻影响，他让国防部的重心偏离了“传统”冲突——这里
指的是，针对国家政权的斗争——而转向了与恐怖分子、贩毒人员、以及游击队这些“非正规”武装的战争。
Low-intensity conflict, the QDR said, is now the “dominant form of warfare.” Fighters and other advanced weapons were of relatively less value. The services would have to adjust accordingly.
《四年国防报告》里说，低强度的冲突现在“成为了战争的主要形式。”战斗机和其它先进武器的价值相对变小了。军队必须做出相应的调整。
Every transition is also an opportunity. With Rumsfeld’s power now at an end, his successor may want to reconsider that QDR decision, at least as it pertains to the Air Force. The question is this: Has DOD overemphasized irregular warfare?
每一次的人事变换都也是一个机会。随着拉姆斯菲尔德权力的终结，他的继任者也许会重新考虑《四年国防报告》里的决定，至少是有关空军的部分。现在的问题是这样的：国防部是否过份强调了非常规战争？
One who thinks a great deal about that issue is Gen. Ronald E. Keys, head of USAF’s Air Combat Command at Langley AFB, Va. As the ACC boss, he’s in charge of some 1,100 aircraft, 25 wings, 15 bases, and 105,000 troops and civilians. He has no choice but to take the long view, and thus his words have special weight.
罗纳德·E.·基斯将军是对此话题十分关心的人员之一，他是弗吉尼亚州兰利空军基地美国空军空战司令部的最高首长。做为空战司令部的老板，他掌管着将近1100架飞机，25个联队，15个基地，以及10万5千人的官兵和文职人员。他不能不做长远的打算，他的话也因此而有着特殊的份量。
“I think there is a danger, and we worry about that,” Keys told the Defense Writers Group, a gathering of Pentagon reporters, on Nov. 9 in Washington, D.C. “Across the Air Force—particularly in Air Combat Command—I had better be able to fight tonight, and I’ve got to be able to fight 30 years from now, too.”
“我认为危险是存在的，我们对此表示担忧，”基斯11月9日在华盛顿五角大楼向国防部作家协会说，它是五角大楼新闻工作者的一个组织。“就整个空军——特别是在空战司令部的职责范围——来说，我不但要能够在今晚升空作战，我还必须要能够在今后30年里继续战斗。”
Iraq and Afghanistan aren’t the only wars to consider. “You’ve got to be able to fight in North Korea,” he said. “You’ve got to be able to defend in the China-Taiwan Strait. You’ve got to be able to go to Iran.” Such scenarios would entail high-intensity clashes with large national forces. Those nations could be defeated only by a technologically advanced “conventional” military.
伊拉克和阿富汗并不是唯一需要考虑的战争。“你还必须要能够在北朝鲜作战，”他说。“你还必须要能够保卫台湾海峡。你还必须要对付伊朗。”这些场合下将不可避免地与大量的国家军队产生高强度的碰撞。这些国家只能被一支技术先进的“传统”军队打败。
Keys has said before that the Air Force is spending a lot of time “trying to find one white SUV racing down the road” in Iraq. He went on to say, “When you get to Korea, your problem is not finding one white SUV; your problem’s going to be 1,000 tubes of artillery shelling Seoul. It’s going to be four tank armies.”
基斯此前曾说过空军在伊拉克花费了太多的时间去“试图沿着公路找到一辆白色的SUV汽车”。他对此继续说道，“当你进入朝鲜时，你面临的问题不是去寻找一辆白色的SUV汽车；你的问题是有将近1000根将对首尔进行轰击的炮管。那里有４个的坦克军。”
Keys said USAF needs versatile platforms, equally good in a permissive environment or a “kick-down-the-door” scenario. The stealthy F-22 Raptor fits the bill to a T, but Rumsfeld imposed a drastic cut—reducing the buy from the 381 that USAF considered the minimum requirement to only 183 today.
基斯说美国空军需要多用途的平台，能够良好地适用于一个宽松的环境或是需要“破门而入”的场合。F-22猛禽隐形战斗机的表现与它的帐单很相配，但拉姆斯菲尔德却对它进行了大量的裁剪——它的采购数量从美国空军认为的最少保有量381架减少到了今天的183架。
“I’ve got 183 of ’em; that’s what I plan to live with,” snapped Keys, when asked if the Air Force would seek more. “I need 381. I can afford 183.”
“我只能得到183架的F-22；我准备勉强接受它，”当问到空军是否将争取更多的的F-22时，基斯斟字酌句地说。“我需要381架。但我能够接受183架的决定。”
Legacy aircraft such as the F-15 won’t carry the mail indefinitely, either. “It’s got a score of 108 to nothing in combat,” Keys observed, “but it won’t be 108 to nothing in combat for the next 30 years.”
诸如F-15这些原有的作战飞机也是前途未卜。“F-15曾经在空战中创造了108比0的记录，”基斯评述说，“但在未来30年的空战里它不会再有108比0的记录了。”
Ironically, Keys noted, modern fighters are ideal even for low-intensity war. “With the F-22 or the F-35,” said Keys, “you have the ability to get in where people don’t see them, the ability to listen where people don’t know you’re listening, and to find things that people don’t want found.” Many ignore this reality, however.
具有讽刺意味的是，基斯指出现代战斗机也是低强度战争的理想装备。“有了F-22或者是F-35,”基斯说，“你就拥有了在不为人知的情况下活动的能力，有了在别人不知道的情况下进行窃听的能力，以及找到那些人们不想让你找到的东西。”但是，一些人却无视这些事实。
USAF will continue to seek high-end, adaptable weaponry. That will at times bring the service into conflict with “people who think you are too sophisticated and you’ve got too much technological overmatch,” said Keys. Success is not assured.
美国空军将继续寻求高端、适用的军备。基斯表示，偶尔也会让部队介入与“认为你很狡猾并且拥有太多技术优势的人”的冲突中。胜负并不总是确定的。
The centrality of irregular warfare is exerting a worrisome influence on the Air Force in another, indirect way—through confusion over Air Force and Army roles and missions.
以非常规战争为中心正在从另一方面以一种间接的方式对空军产生令人不安的影响——它使空军和陆军的角色及任务完全混乱了。
The problem stems from the Pentagon’s large-scale diversion of USAF airmen into missions normally performed by Army soldiers—the so-called “in-lieu-of” taskings. Thousands of airmen are filling in for Army troops. This has been done to allow the ground service to fight in Iraq and Afghanistan even as it remakes itself into a lighter, more mobile force at home.
问题产生的原因在于五角大楼大范围地将美国空军的官兵投入到通常应该由陆军士兵履行的任务中——因此这也就被人称之为“代替”任务。成千上万的空军官兵被充实到陆军部队中。这样做就是要允许陆军在伊拉克和阿富汗作战的同时还能够在家里把自己重组成一支更轻型，更具有机动性的部队。
“We have a problem,” said Keys. “I’m spending money to train people in skills that I don’t maintain in the United States Air Force.” Example: Airmen driving 50-caliber gun trucks in Iraqi convoys, or airmen serving as volunteer interrogators.
“我们有一个问题，”基斯说。“我花了很多的金钱训练官兵的技能，而这些技能对于美国空军来说是不需要的。”举例来说：空军官兵在伊拉克运输队的卡车上操纵50口径的机枪，或者义务充当审讯人员。
He notes that ACC security forces, in any 12-month period, are deployed to Iraq for six months and prepping for the next deployment for two months—eight months in all—making it hard to meet ACC’s own needs. When it comes to explosive ordnance disposal specialists, truck drivers, and combat engineers, the story is much the same.
他指出空战司令部安全部队每12个月就要部署到伊拉克6个月并且还要为下一次的部署进行为期两个月的练习——加在一起一共是8个月——这些任务与空战司令部的需要几乎毫无关联。当他们成为爆破军火处理专家，卡车司机，以及战斗工兵时，情形基本上是一样的。
Providing “outside-the-wire” base security poses a special problem. “I’m paying for light infantry and getting armored fighting vehicles for my folks,” said Keys. “The question is, should I be doing that against all of the other things I should be doing?” Inevitably, Air Force readiness is diminished.
提供“铁丝网之外”的基地安全产生了一个特殊的问题。“我正在为轻装步兵和为我的官兵装备装甲战斗车辆付钱，”基斯说，“现在的问题是，我应该把钱从我应该投入的方向转移出来，转而用在这些方面么？”不可避免地，空军的战备完好程度降低了。
The ACC chief knows his remarks aren’t welcome everywhere. According to Keys, “These are unpopular questions that people don’t like to speak about, but the unspeakable will happen, whether you speak about it or not.”
这位空战司令部的最高长官知道他的评论在哪都不受欢迎。按照基斯的原话说，“这些问题都是人们不愿提及的话题，但不被谈论的事情也仍要发生，不管你是不是在讨论它。”
The bedrock of current US military doctrine is “full spectrum dominance”—the ability to defeat the enemy at any point on the ladder of escalation. It hinges on the ability to control the skies, swiftly defeat an invading enemy, and rapidly take the fight to the adversary. It requires, in a word, airpower.
当前美国的军事理论的基础是“全面主宰”——即在各个阶段的任何方向上拥有打败敌人的能力。这种能力的关键在于控制天空，快速击败入侵的敌人，并且迅速将战斗转入到敌方境内。用一个词来形容这种需要，就是制空权。
That is worth remembering. Some new emphasis on irregular threats was warranted, but overcorrection can be dangerous, and it is not easy to know when that has happened.
这是值得牢记于心的。对非常规威胁进行一些强调是需要的，但纠枉过正就变得危险了，而且要知道这种强调什么时候过头了并不是那么的容易。
“How will you know?” asked Keys. “You only know if you screw it up when a war happens. That’s the hard part. There’s no metric out there that tells you you’ve got exactly the right force.”
“你怎么才能知道呢？”基斯反问道。“你只有在战争发生的时候切身体会到才会知道原来的分寸掌握的是否合适。这是很困难的。并没有一个公制刻度摆在那来告诉你是不是已经拥有了一支非常合适的部队。“
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